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Book Reviews

The Incompleat Burkean:
Bruce Ackerman's Foundation
for Constitutional History
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991. Pp. x, 369. $24.95 (cloth), $9.95 (paper).

Eben Moglen

With this book, the first in a projected series of at least three volumes,
Bruce Ackerman confirms what attentive readers of his law review articles of the past ten years have already known-he is the most original
and important writer on constitutional theory in the contemporary English-speaking world. We the People: Foundations, despite its informal,
sometimes overly talky style, is not an easy book. Filled to the brim,
even to overflowing, and containing many gestures in the direction of
arguments to be made in future volumes rather than the substance of the
arguments themselves, it presents both the casual reader and the reviewer
with a complex task of assimilation, understanding, and judgment. No
single critique of the book can do justice to the whole of its content, let
alone its potential, particularly when appropriate reservation is made for
the fact that much of this first volume is promise rather than delivery.
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But even with what we have, Ackerman's book attempts to establish in a
single imaginative bound the agenda for both constitutional history and
theory in the last decade of the twentieth century; given the scope of its
ambitions, the dialogue over its significance cannot begin too soon, or be
carried on too heatedly. My own interest as a legal historian is with
Ackerman's attempt to revise the entire span of American constitutional
history; others will no doubt concentrate on his political theory, or his
analysis of the contemporary quandary of constitutional politics and the
Supreme Court. But while this book could hardly be styled a seamless
web, a summary of Ackerman's remarkably fertile theoretical conceptions must precede any attention to his historical and historiographic
arguments.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL DUALISM

The center of Ackerman's thought is a claim of uniqueness for the
constitutional arrangements of the United States-a claim of "American
exceptionalism," in the usual historiographic jargon. Ackerman's claim
is that the theory embodied in the 1787 Constitution is a theory of "dualist democracy," in which institutional structure presupposes a distinction
between periods of "normal politics" on the one hand and "constitutional moments," or periods of higher lawmaking, on the other. Ackerman's dualist recognizes that the outcomes of majoritarian institutions in
times of "normal" politics do not fully reflect the choices "We the People" would make for ourselves. Only on those occasions when, through
mobilization of levels of public engagement impossible to sustain indefinitely, the institutions or individuals leading movements for major structural reform succeed in raising politics to the "higher lawmaking track,"
does our dualist tradition fully gratify the impulse of all politicians in a
democratic order, by validating their claim to speak in fact for the People
at large.
The consequences of this paradigm are many, and their elucidation is
the substance of Ackerman's entire project. At the outset, however, the
theory of constitutional dualism allows Ackerman to distinguish his own
approach from those "monisms," as he calls them (pp. 7-16), that assume
no distinction between "normal" and "constitutional" politics in the
United States. One set of monists, unable to distinguish between Congress pursuing its ordinary business of politics as usual and the moments
of higher lawmaking, perceives in the Supreme Court's power of judicial
review a "counter-majoritarian difficulty." Another set, committed to
the monistic belief that all politics are equal within the democratic constitutional order, but equally committed to the protection of "fundamental" rights, become "rights foundationalists"-determined to entrench
certain exogenously derived norms beyond the possibility of interference
by any political process. Ackerman rightly proclaims that "[t]he clash
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between monists and foundationalists dominates the present field of constitutional debate" (p. 16).' He associates both theoretical positions with
non-American influences on constitutional thought-an "Anglophilia"
traceable at least as far back as Woodrow Wilson, whose admiration of
British Parliamentary supremacy leads to monism of the pure
majoritarian school, and the influence of Kant or Locke (depending on
the flavor) for foundationalist premises. Dualism, then, becomes the distinctively American theory upon which a true grasp of our development
should be founded.
Monists, whether of the purely majoritarian or foundationalist sort,
must defend themselves against the weight of Ackerman's criticism. In
the main, I find myself in agreement with his basic premise, though with
some reservations. For Ackerman also distinguishes his dualism from
what he calls "the paradoxes of American 'Burkeanism' " (p. 17).
Edmund Burke, Ackerman believes, is the archetype of another historicist approach to constitutional theory, also capable of recognizing the
difference between normal and constitutional politics, but hampered by
three intellectual failings-"conservative incrementalism," a distrust of
self-conscious appeals to principle, and an elitist disdain for actual selfgovernment by the people, as opposed to their wisely chosen (and wiser)
representatives (pp. 19-21). Here I agree neither that Ackerman has captured the essence of Burkeanism as it figures in the American constitutional tradition, nor that he has adequately distinguished the "Burkean"
approaches he criticizes from those for which he contends himself. I
shall return to these points in the concluding section of this essay.
Having sounded the major theme of his labor, which is to recover the
genuine dualist premises of American constitutionalism, Ackerman
surveys the obstacles to acceptance of his view. Why have we so easily
bought the essentially "foreign" monist approaches to constitutional theory? For Ackerman, the answer lies in our failure to appreciate the real
contours of our constitutional history. Monist theories have produced
monist histories, as an outgrowth of which we are unable to perceive
precisely those details of our constitutional development that would in
turn clarify the dualist theoretical principles to which the Constitution of
1787 committed us. Historicism of an intensely revisionary character is
thus the centerpiece of Ackerman's argument, at least as he sketches it
1. Ackerman's own use of the term "monists" tends to include only majoritarians who believe in
legislative supremacy, as in this sentence, which distinguishes between monists and rights
foundationalists. In this employment of the terminology, Ackerman's dualism is intermediate
between monism and foundationalism. Conceptually, it seems to me to make more sense to
emphasize that what pure majoritarians share with rights foundationalists is a belief that
constitutional politics has but a single mode: either the mode of respect for "normal" politics
tempered by weak judicial review, or the mode of protection-by both legislative and judicial
means-of fundamental rights. Ackerman's distinctive contribution is the argument that only a
dual-mode description of the American constitutional tradition makes history and theory coherent.
In this broader sense, both majoritarians and rights foundationalists are monists.
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out in the present volume. Ackerman premises his entire effort on the
most exceptionalist form of revisionist constitutional historiography
since William Crosskey's notorious Politics and the Constitution.'
But any similarity between Crosskey and Ackerman is merely superficial. Ackerman's revised constitutional history hinges on two basic concepts: the division of that history into three separate "constitutional
regimes," and the work of "integrating interpretation" by which the
Supreme Court undertakes (well or ill) to establish continuity across the
divides separating those regimes.
First, the regimes themselves. The first extended from 1789 through
the end of the Civil War, and more particularly the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The second regime (the "Middle Republic") lasted
until the New Deal, and more particularly the "switch in time" that
Edward Corwin first called the revolution of 1937. As the reference to
Corwin makes clear, Ackerman is by no means the first student of American constitutional history to adopt such a sharp periodization or to
locate the epochal divisions in our history as he does. The conceptual
novelty, and the power, of Ackerman's history is the claim that the
regimes were born not merely from the adoption of new substantive principles largely incompatible with those of the constitutional past, but
rather from fundamental change in the method of constitutional politics.
Each of the three regimes was born, according to Ackerman, from the
adoption of a new method for switching from "normal politics" to
"higher lawmaking." Dualism, in short, is not only the primary theoretical commitment of our constitutional order: the search for a workable set
of dualist mechanisms under changing conditions is the basic mechanism
of our historical experience. Thus the first constitutional regime, that of
the Federalists, was born out of the use of the Constitutional Convention,
an extralegal body whose theory called for higher lawmaking through
conventions, or through cooperation between federal and state legislatures, as laid out in Article V of the 1787 Constitution. But the second
regime, of the Middle Republic, was ushered in not by a series of amendments adopted under Article V, but rather by a Congressionally led process of higher lawmaking that forced ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment without the required supermajority of the States. And the
third regime, that of 1937, arose from a presidentially led movement
which eschewed even the outward form of constitutional amendment,
preferring instead the path of "transformative opinions" affirming a
sweeping legislative program in the Supreme Court, which opinions were
secured by renewal of the Court itself, through the power of Presidential
appointment.
2. WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES (1953).
3. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941).
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For Ackerman, then, the history of the United States Constitution is
divided into three periods by sharp discontinuous change in our
approach to the basic question of dualist democracy-how can we tell
whether a particular set of actors can properly lay claim to be making
"higher" or fundamental law in the name of the American People, rather
than simply undertaking a particularly brash form of politics as usual?
Dualism underlay all three regimes, but the "professional narrative" of
our constitutional history, being to one degree or another afflicted with
exogenous monisms, told a different story. The Federalist Constitution,
at least as explicated in the opinions of Chief Justice John Marshall, was
taken as the summum bonum of the tradition. The due process jurisprudence of the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court was lamented as a falling-away from the true religion, salvationally rediscovered by the Court
in 1937, just in time to save the Republic from a frightful confrontation
that might have wrecked the Constitution altogether.
This last point focuses attention on the role of the Supreme Court in
dualist constitutional regimes. Having disposed of the monism that sees
all judicial review as interference in the process of majoritarian government, since for the dualist any majority in any legislature is claiming to
speak for the People, not actually so speaking, Ackerman can resolve the
long-ballyhooed problem of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." During times of "normal politics," when fundamental lawmaking is not
occurring through the great mobilization of the People, the Court serves
a "preservationist" role-protecting the higher law already in existence
from incursions by institutions claiming for themselves more political
support than they actually possess.4
And what of the Court's role in "constitutional moments," those occasions on which, through popular mobilization, our dualist democracy
shifts to its "higher track"? Until 1937, Ackerman believes, the Court
played little or no role in the process of higher lawmaking itself. Instead,
the Court performed a more difficult and much less well-understood role:
it attempted, by "integrating interpretation" in Ackerman's phrase, to
reconcile the new fundamental law resulting from higher-track politics
with the surviving elements of the old constitutional regime. For Ackerman, the much-despised jurisprudence of the Lochner era5 (indeed, of the
"Middle Republic" from 1866 to 1937) was an attempt to integrate the
nationalist, rights-oriented fundamental law of the Fourteenth Amendment with the non-nationalist, rather rights-insensitive constitution of
the Federalist Founders. Though Ackerman concedes that this enterprise was conducted with far from perfect success, he insists that our
4. Although he never explicitly acknowledges the fact, Ackerman thus joins another line of
constitutional theory that emphasizes the preservative, or "validating," function of judicial review.
See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1962).
5. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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traditional "professional narrative," through its need to show that the
events of the New Deal era were consistent with the "original intent" of
the Federalist Constitution, has always emphasized a nonexistent continuity with the Marshall Court, wrongly reducing the Justices of the
Waite, White, and Taft eras to the roles of imbeciles or evil
misinterpreters.
So Ackerman's purpose is to displace the professional narrative. History founded on proper conceptions, recognizing the distinctive dualism
of American constitutionalism, would bring new and more respectable
light to the constitutional jurisprudence of the Lochner era, as well as
explain to us both the true meaning of the Federalist Papers and the
proper role of the Supreme Court in American government. On these,
and a host of other matters, We the People: Foundations provides the
beginning of the revision. We cannot yet form a judgment on the overall
success of the project, for Ackerman has told us that the detailed argument is yet to come. But we know enough, at least of his present intentions, to define the contours of the argument he seeks to make, and to
estimate the strength of the obstacles against which it must contend.
II.

INTIMATIONS OF HISTORY, TRACES OF DUALISM

Consideration of Ackerman's new constitutional history should begin
with Part Two of his book, in which he presents at length his historical
interpretation of the Federalist Papers. Ackerman regards Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay (to whom he chooses to refer collectively by the joint
pseudonym "Publius," a point to which I return below), and by implication the other framers and supporters of the 1787 Constitution, as "successful revolutionaries," seeking to protect the gains of their movement
(p. 165). Their insight, Ackerman claims, was a complete awareness of
the impracticability of keeping the People endlessly involved in the business of politics, joined to an acute understanding of the inevitable corruptions of normal politics, in which the self-seeking, delusion, and
factionalism among the People's "representatives" act to erode the principles of virtue created by a political community fully engaged in a revolutionary situation. This insight, which Ackerman finds throughout the
Federalist-though,perhaps not surprisingly, primarily in papers written
by Madison-is the heart of constitutional dualism. Its outcome, within
the literary context of the Federalist Papers themselves, is the famous
principle of the "economy of virtue." If politics are properly structured
and carefully nurtured, the Federalist says, the available resource of
political virtue in the community, though not enough to sustain revolutionary ardor and equivalent public-mindedness at all times, will nonetheless carry society through the periods when the mass of men are
unsurprisingly more interested in their own pursuits than in the
commonweal.

Moglen

1993]

In so reading the Federalist Papers, and in so viewing the men who
created both them and the Philadelphia Constitution, Ackerman is in
good company. But he commits himself, and the success of his interpretation, entirely to one strand of a deeply contested historiography, for he
must make the Founders of the Constitution true revolutionaries. Ackerman is fully conscious of this historiographic commitment, and much
of this section of his book is an attack on Charles Beard and the
"Thermidorean" interpretation of the Federal Convention. For Ackerman, the Progressive historians who joined Beard in approaching the
Framers as a collection of counter-revolutionaries, bent on improving the
value of the public debentures they held in their private and class portfolios, created a monist myth of the constitutional past. The work of Beard
himself, in the landmark Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of
the United States,6 is probably obsolete, not least due to the work represented by Forrest McDonald's book We The People, whose title Ackerman has respectfully borrowed.7 But this by no means eliminates the
vitality of all counter-revolutionary interpretations of the Federal Convention, another point to which I return below.
Granting arguendo Ackerman's approach to the framers of the Federalist Papers, we can join his larger narrative of the fate of constitutional
dualism, contained in Part One of the present volume. Having created
constitutional arrangements that economized on virtue through the
establishment of a higher-track lawmaking system for fundamental law
(enshrined in Article V of the proposed constitution), the Framers then
secured its ratification through measures (direct submission to conventions of the People in the States, the vote of nine State conventions to be
binding upon all) directly contravening the relevant provision of the
Articles of Confederation. Surely Ackerman is correct in saying that this
reliance upon an extralegal convention to make fundamental law directly
followed, in the minds of the Framers, the convention that determined
constitutional arrangements in England in 1688. That this established at
least a tolerance, if not a preference, for extraconstitutional modes of
constitutional lawmaking in the American tradition is one of the most
profound insights supporting his new historiography.
Ackerman's historical account proceeds through the history of the
new Federal Republic, emphasizing the localist cast of the institutions
created. For Ackerman, the nationalism of the Marshall Court has been
much overstated in the professional narrative, which we might also call
the received wisdom. The essence of the Federalist achievement was its
6.

CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES
7.

(1913).

FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1958). Ackerman acknowledges McDonald, and justifies, perhaps unnecessarily, the reuse of the
title (p. x).
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economy of nationalist sentiment as well as virtue, in the sense that the
new republic was as nationalist as the sentiments of the people would
tolerate, despite the desires of Hamilton, among others, for a much
stronger commercial union. For Ackerman, at least at this stage in the
development of his argument, the reigning characteristics of the constitutional law of the first regime were federalism, in the sense of anti-nationalist localism, and a comparative disregard for individual civil rights.
The one exception, on this latter point, was the concern for protection of
property and economic liberty contained in the Contracts Clause, and
made a basic part of the constitutional common law through Marshall's
decision in the Dartmouth College case.8
What little nationalism there was in the constitutional law of the Marshall Court, Ackerman believes, was eroded in the jurisprudence of
Roger Taney's Court-most notably the reduction of the nationalizing
implications of Marshall's Commerce Clause in Mayor of New York v.
Miln,9 and the reduction of the vested rights approach to property in
Charles River Bridge.10 While experiments with what Ackerman calls
the "plebiscitary Presidency"-the use of national elections as mandates
for basic constitutional change-occurred in the early republic (most
notably in 1800 with the election of Thomas Jefferson and in 1824-28
with the balked and then fulfilled populism that swept Andrew Jackson
to power), Ackerman sees the first constitutional regime as one in which
the higher lawmaking authority remained where Article V placed it-in
the legislatures of the Federal Government and the States.
But a plebiscitary election in 1860 changed that pattern, precipitating
constitutional crisis and Civil War. The resulting mandate for constitutional change might have been carried by the Presidency, but the assassination of Lincoln and the truculent resistance of Andrew Johnson to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment brought Congressional rather
than Presidential power to the fore in the next period of higher lawmaking. Radical Republicanism secured the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment not by votes of three-quarters of the State Legislatures, as
required by Article V, but by an extralegal process depending upon Congressionally sponsored military reconstruction of States whose admission
to the Union hinged on acceptance of the Amendment.
The forcible rewriting of fundamental law ushered in the Middle
Republic, the second of our constitutional regimes. For the Supreme
Court, whose effectiveness as preserver of the old order had been broken
by Dred Scott1 1 even before the war and the Congressional seizure of
higher lawmaking power, the challenge posed by the Fourteenth Amend8. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
9. 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
10. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
11. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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ment was to make the first of the "integrative interpretations"-synthesizing what remained of the old order with the new, highly nationalist,
rights-based conceptions implied by the language of the Reconstruction
Amendments. For Ackerman, the process of judicial interpretation in
the Middle Republic consisted of the intellectual attempt to make the
integration. As he sees it, the essence of that interpretation, contained
first in experimental form in the 1870s-despite the false start in the
Slaughter-House Cases1 2 -and then refined in the Lochner era, consisted
of reviving the property-centered rights conceptions of the old order, and
using them to control state action in a new nationalist vein.
Serious challenges were posed to this new order, particularly in a series
of "failed plebiscitary elections" in which the Populist Party and the
weaker populism of Bryanism confronted the reigning Republican orthodoxy. The challenges were resisted, largely through the preservationist
role of the Supreme Court, until the collapse of the national economy in
1929-1933. Franklin Roosevelt, proposing a broad range of national
political initiatives with redistributive and anti-propertarian effects,
touched off a confrontation with the preservationist Court, and chose to
test his mandate for higher lawmaking through the Presidential plebiscite
of 1936. Having prevailed, thus bringing about what Ackerman calls a
"constitutional moment," FDR chose to make new higher law through
the presidential leadership approach, never before tried in the history of
the Republic. The precise mold in which that leadership cast itself was a
proposal to reorganize the preservationist institution, the Supreme Court,
which had denied the higher law effect of the New Deal statutes.
Eschewing the approach of Amendment under Article V, FDR chose
first to intimidate the Court with the packing plan, and then, after the
"switch in time" of 1937, to renew the Bench through "transformative"
appointments, using the presidential nomination power to revise the
common law constitution. The effect, as Ackerman brilliantly observes,
was to achieve fundamental lawmaking by judicial opinion-paradoxically strengthening the common law element in American constitutionalism even as it created a new constitutional regime, hinged on the
President's power of mass political mobilization and appointment to the
chief institution of dualist preservation.
The new constitutional regime ushered in by the New Deal revolution
also required the Supreme Court to make an integrative synthesis of the
old and new regimes. Here Ackerman's history, as he himself acknowledges, is particularly sketchy, but he perceives in both Brown v. Board of
Education" and Griswold v. Connecticut" signs of that integrative process under way, as the Court struggled to synthesize the rights-based
12.
13.
14.

83 U.S. 36 (1873).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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nationalism of the Middle Republic with those non-economic rights that
replaced property conceptions as the center of constitutional attention
after the New Deal. Though this conceptualization is only embryonic in
the present volume, it bids fair, when more fully fleshed out in later
work, to explain in a fashion hitherto difficult to specify the nature of the
Warren Court's interest in the criminal procedure system. Unfortunately, however, Ackerman does not discuss what were probably the
most important constitutional cases from the point of view of the "Mod5 Reynolds v. Sims, 6 and
em" regime in his analysis-Baker v. Carr,"
Katzenbach v. South Carolina,"'in which the Middle Republic's founding documents, the Reconstruction amendments, were integrated with
new approaches to the higher-law management of normal politics.1 8
III.

THEORY AS HISTORY-RESERVATIONS

Even the very brief outline of Ackerman's approach to constitutional
history provided in the volume under review, and summarized even more
cursorily here, suggests the importance that Ackerman's conceptions
might have in altering at least the emphasis, if not the basic outlook, of
constitutional history in the years to come. Displacing the received wisdom in favor of a self-consciously dualist account of the constitutional
development of the United States would be, for those of us who agree
with Ackerman's basic premise, a good thing. But the present volume,
for all its conceptual breadth and apparently boundless intellectual
enthusiasm, seems to me significantly to understate the difficulties
involved in recasting the sweep of our history as Ackerman proposes.
Ackerman's historiographic criticism seems too easily to dispose of alternative approaches to the writing of constitutional history on other premises, and his reconstructions of the critical turning points in the history as
he sees it, 9 while enormously provocative, have not yet been described in
ways which meet what seem the most important probable exceptions,
reservations, or counter-arguments. This leads me to wonder whether
Ackerman's theoretical positions on a number of subsidiary points, bating entirely the issue of dualism, on which he is absolutely convincing,
might not be overstated. This, in turn, brings us to the question of
Burkeanism.
15. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
18. Some helpful guides to the relevant conceptualizations in this area may perhaps be found in
Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism about Formalism, TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming June 1993).
19. Apparently to be the subject of his forthcoming second volume, significantly entitled, at least
from my point of view, We the People: Transformations.
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Theory as History

As the footnotes to the present volume show, Ackerman has mastered
the contemporary historiography with the same erudition and imaginative grasp he shows with respect to all other elements of the scholarly
literature with which he deals. Yet he is not, again by admission, a committed practitioner of the "no-nonsense, original-source style" of academic history in the United States, preferring the "historicophilosophical idiom" represented for him by Hannah Arendt (p. 219).2o
This is a matter of skill and taste, and it might well be said that a closer
attention to the ebb and flow of historical detail would have strangled
Ackerman's profound conceptual project; perhaps the substance of the
volumes to come will show. But whatever the truth on this point, Ackerman's account already shows, at least to one reader whose methodological premises are opposite to his own, the inevitable drawbacks resulting
from the primacy of theory over history, or of conceptions over
experience.
For it is the messiness of our constitutional history that Ackerman is
compelled to simplify-not only for purposes of expressing complex
ideas in a brief space, but because his dualism, for all that he wishes to
avoid reductionism, 21 is reductive. At several-indeed, at the most crucial-points in his historical account, Ackerman indulges in the foreshortening of historical detail in order to finesse inconvenient factual
objections. The objections themselves are probably not insurmountable,
and those of us in sympathy with the project can certainly hope to see
them surmounted, either by Ackerman's later work or by the other constitutional history it is sure to inspire, but we should know at the outset
that there are problems to overcome.
1.

The Federalists

The first, and perhaps the most important, of Ackerman's reductions
is his visualization of the Federalists as successful revolutionaries, free of
all the counter-revolutionary impulses attributed to them by the Progressive historiography of Charles Beard and his epigones. In this regard,
Ackerman proposes to treat as entirely resolved the long-running
polarized debate among historians over the revolutionary character of
the Federal Convention. To be sure, there are profound attractions in
Ackerman's resolution. On the historiographic side, as I have already
mentioned, the strongest form of the counter-revolutionary hypothesis,
20. It is ironic, but not in any derogatory sense, that the strong American exceptionalism of
Ackerman's substance is joined to a rather Germanic taste in forms of historical investigation and
expression.
21. And he does. Ackerman is clearly and forcefully critical of the reductionisms abroad in the
political and social sciences, not least the contemporary madness for treating all social interactions
as the work of that imaginary species, homunculus economicus. See, e.g., p. 228 n.*.
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originally presented by Beard, has not worn well. In addition, the work
of Gordon Wood-which continued the association between radical
Whiggery in England and revolutionary ideology in eighteenth-century
America, originally observed in Bernard Bailyn's classic work, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 2 2-provides a powerful support to Ackerman's approach, by setting an intellectual and social
background for the Philadelphia Convention as an association of
revolutionaries.2 3
Nor is Ackerman's preference for Federalists unquestionably revolutionary in sympathy solely a result of historiographic fashion. The substantive interpretation of the Federalist project as an exercise in counterrevolutionary repression, or even just swag-accumulation through inflation of the value of public securities, has always suffered from implausibility, in view of the palpable intellectual seriousness with which the
debate over the ratification of the Federal Constitution embraced questions of undoubtedly revolutionary character. Yet a constitutional history predicated on the entire absence of counter-revolutionary elements
from Federalist thought would be as misleading as the Progressive historiography to which Ackerman objects. Surely Ackerman is right to see
Madison's fulminations against "improper or wicked" measures such as
"paper money, . . . abolition of debts, . . . [and] an equal division of
property" in Federalist No. 10 as peripheral to the political theory that
renders it relevant to our time (p. 228), but it does not follow that one
can safely disregard the evident social conservatism of the Philadelphia
Convention's men and measures.
Ackerman is aware of the problem. Although in general extremely
admiring of Hannah Arendt's approach to Federalist political theory
expressed in On Revolution,24 Ackerman explicitly departs from Arendt's
belief that the genius of American revolutionary thought lay in refusing
to acknowledge the "social question." Instead, Ackerman suggests that
the essence of Federalism was confrontation with the social question
through "revolutionary reform"-dualist constitutional arrangements
that confined discussions of the social question during times of normal
politics, and transferred crises of social and economic import onto the
higher track of constitutional lawmaking (pp. 208-12).
Conceptually, this seems highly promising, particularly since it avoids
the unpleasant connotations of the Progressive historiography, which
seemed to saddle us retrospectively with a reactionary constitution
22.

23.

BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).

Ackerman primary relies on GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (1969). The publication of GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1992) came too late for incorporation into Ackerman's first volume, but one can
confidently expect Wood's enormously successful expansion of his own prior views to play a critical
role in Ackerman's future volumes.
24. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963).
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formed in a confrontation between the masses and the classes, which the
classes won. But history would not be well served if Ackerman's easy
synthesis became the received wisdom. For the hostility to measures of
social and economic reform breathed in the language of FederalistNo. 10
not only is real, but it formed an important, perhaps essential, intellectual and political background to the formation of the Federalist constitutional regime. A large contribution to the difference between the failed
Annapolis Convention of 1786 and the successful Philadelphia Convention of 1787 was the participation of George Washington in the latter
event, and Washington's willingness to forsake his apolitical retirement
was explicitly an outgrowth of the alarmist treatment of Shays's Rebellion deliberately spread by his former chief adjutants, including Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox.2 5 Their inflated account of the Shaysite
disturbances-which they were in fact concerned would be put down
only too quickly-announced the beginning of a general social revolution, which all good men ought to be willing to hasten to Philadelphia to
prevent. The measures proposed in the Philadelphia Convention, and
the willingness to employ extralegal measures to secure their ratification
in the States, speak to the importance of counter-insurgency in the ideology of the Framers.
On one level, to be sure, this history only confirms Ackerman's point
that "the Founders held notions of property rights different from those
that prevail in America today" (p. 228). But John Jay's statement that
"the people who own this country ought to govern it," like Madison's
anti-egalitarian political economy in Federalist No. 10, should not be
elided in our balancing of concepts of revolution, counter-revolution, and
reform in the history of the events culminating in the 1787 Constitution.
Ackerman's central conclusions are worthy of the most serious respect,
but the history on which he bases them, so far as he has outlined it here,
is too polar-too committed to the conceptual purity of the first great
constitutional moment.
The same tendency may be observed in his literary analysis of the FederalistPapers themselves. To accept as reality the persona of "Publius,"
and to discuss the papers as though "he" wrote them, strikes me as a
serious mistake. Three quite adroit professionals composed the papers,
each an expert in the combined arts of lawyering, propagandizing, and
electioneering so frequently conjoined in eighteenth-century America.
Each has different attitudes and ideas to present, and each is concerned
with different facets of the immediate political situation in order to affect
25. For particularly interesting recent scholarship on the conspiratorial maneuvering that
secured Washington's presence in Philadelphia in the fall of 1787, and the propagandist use made of
Shays' minor "Regulation" by conservative Federalist officers and former officers in the Continental
Army, see Rock Brynner, "Fire Beneath Our Feet": Shays's Rebellion and its Constitutional Impact
(1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University).
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which, after all, the papers were initially composed. Even Jay and Hamilton, two New York lawyers with similar experiences in the Byzantine
ways of New York political life, have dissimilar styles and approaches to
the problems presented by the ratification campaign. Refusal to treat the
ideas of the Federalist as the outgrowth of collaboration among definite
individuals suits the "philosophico-historical" method Ackerman
admires, and is part of the idealizing genre of academic political theory,
but it probably represents a poor basis for the reconstructive intellectual
history of the Constitution's foundation. One hopes that as Ackerman
returns to the subject in later volumes he will reconsider the decision to
write of "Publius," rather than the individuals who actually thought and
wrote the work we are all taught to admire.
Consideration of the individual, historically situated, Federalistsrather than the idealized fictive persona they created-might also have
led to another theoretical refinement deeply to be desired in our new constitutional history. Surprisingly, in view of his own education and concerns, Ackerman is remarkably silent on the role of the legal culture in
the creation of our various constitutional regimes. Not only the authors
of the Federalist,but the vast majority of the leading figures of the Revolutionary and Federal generations, were lawyers. The early republican
culture, as Robert Ferguson has brilliantly pointed out, was dominated
by the thought-ways of lawyers.2 6 And, more to our immediate purpose,
our constitutional tradition, including the revolutionary constitutionalism from which Ackerman traces the descent of the 1787 document, was
born of the legal thought of the late British Empire. To understand the
constitutional history of the Revolution and its aftermath, and thus to
grasp the roots of our constitutional dualism, attention to the legal
thought, particularly the constitutional lawyering, of late colonial
America is critically important. The work of John Phillip Reid, as I have
previously pointed out,27 importantly supplements, and sometimes
refutes, the tradition of intellectual history represented by Bernard
Bailyn and Gordon Wood, which systematically underestimates the seriousness of the legal arguments made in the pamphlet literature of the
revolutionary period. 28 Attention to the legal content of the Federalist
project, including the extent of continuity between the legal problems of
26. See ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984).
27. See Eben Moglen, John Reid's Revolution, 9 L. & HIST. REV. 389 (1991) (book review).
28. Reid's output in recent years has been profuse, and almost all of it bears importantly on the
origins of our constitutional theory. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986-1991); JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN
THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1988); JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1989). Ackerman's attention has
obviously not been called to Reid's work, which is nowhere cited in his volume. As Ackerman
himself says-rather too patronizingly for my taste-in criticizing Gordon Wood for ignoring the
work of Hannah Arendt, "nobody's perfect" (p. 219).
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the late Empire and the early Republic, is long overdue.29 One of the
most important invitations presented by We the People: Foundationsis to
press that project forward, precisely to investigate the origins of dualist
constitutional thought in the Empire before 1776.
2. Models of ConstitutionalLeadership
The other elements of Ackerman's new constitutional history are
much less fully presented in the present volume than is his history of the
foundation of the first regime, and perhaps comment should be withheld
until the outlines have been somewhat more filled in. But a few isolated
points seem worthy of mention, since they relate to the general difficulty
of history written for the demonstration of clear conceptual propositions.
As an initial example, Ackerman's laudable commitment to the intellectual rehabilitation of the jurisprudence of the Middle Republic leads
him to corrective exaggeration of the distance between the Marshall
Court and the nationalist jurisprudence of the New Deal, precisely
because he believes the received wisdom has exaggerated their similarity.
For Ackerman, Marshall participated in the general anti-nationalist
approach of the Founders' Constitution. But conceptualism on this
point may be deceptive. Perhaps the received wisdom has been right
about John Marshall, notwithstanding that it has been wrong about
much else. Marshall differed from the older generation of revolutionaries
convened at Philadelphia, and even from his contemporaries such as
Hamilton and Burr, in that his education as a lawyer occurred almost
entirely within the domain of the new Federal legal system. What little
legal practice John Marshall had before ascending the Bench was almost
entirely in federal fora, largely concerned with federal statutory and regulatory law, mostly in litigating questions of military pensions. This
aspect of Marshall's legal education has been generally under-emphasized, though Leonard Baker's biography at least presents the materials
from which conclusions might be drawn. 0 As a lawyer and a judge,
Marshall's basic impulse was towards a single national legal order-a
"preservationist" point of view for Marshall himself, since it was the system he had known. Much of his ideological distance from other Federalists can be seen to center on this point; it is no accident that his dismissal
of the FederalistPapers as determinative constitutional authority occurs
in the strongest nationalist passage of one of the strongest of nationalist
opinions in the United States Reports: M'Culloch v. Maryland."t
Individual persons and events are always more complex than our con29. See Eben Moglen, The Passage of Federalisms-Reconsidering the Legal History of the
Later Eighteenth Century, Address at the American Society for Legal History Annual Meeting,
(Feb. 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
30.

See LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW (1974).

31.

17 U.S. 316, 433 (1819).
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ceptions would allow, and the gravest problems of history-writing occur
in the attempt to mediate between the necessity for generalizing conceptions and the intractable refusal of facts to fit within our categories. In
his treatment of both the events of 1866 and those of 1935-1937, Ackerman interprets the political struggle surrounding constitution-making as
a clash of institutional actors. "Congress," "the Court," even "the plebiscitary Presidency" (though more often "Johnson" or "Roosevelt") are
the active agents in sentences describing the political or constitutional
process. Like the reification of "Publius," this strategy of description
renders conceptions clear, but the metonymy is historiographically
costly. Radical Republicanism, to take the first example, was a highly
complex political phenomenon, never completely in control of Congress
even after the election of 1866. As William Nelson has established, the
constitutional theories at play in Congress during the struggle to enact
and ratify the Fourteenth Amendment were ambiguous, and their results
were even more deliberately so, as Congress left much to be resolved by a
Supreme Court called upon for precisely the sort of "integrative interpretation" Ackerman describes. a2 Similarly, in writing the constitutional
history of the New Deal crisis, Ackerman proceeds as though Roosevelt
never seriously considered constitutional amendment under Article V as
an alternative to the course eventually followed, but the record of intraAdministration discussion on this point was long, acrimonious, and
controversial. 3
Ackerman's conceptual clarity comes, in both these cases, at the
expense of a more sensitive rendering of the contingencies in what he
rightly sees as the critical moments in our constitutional development.
In neither case, one suspects, are the fundamentals of his interpretation
at stake-his conceptions will not stand or fall on the simplicity of
description they make possible.
Some larger complexities in the intellectual history will have to be confronted as well, if Ackerman's account is to be rendered fully convincing.
As I have already mentioned, Ackerman's attack on the received wisdom
about the Lochner era hinges on the notion that the constitutional jurisprudence of the Middle Republic attempted-largely successfully-the
"integrating interpretation" of the Fourteenth Amendment's natural
rights outlook in the context of the rights-insensitive Federalist constitution of the antebellum period. But as Morton Horwitz has shown in his
recent book, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960, much of
the legal thought of Ackerman's Middle Republic was explicitly hostile
to the natural rights dogma that had been more, rather than less, influen32.

See

WILLIAM

E.

NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE

TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).

33.

For a capsule account, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
1935-1936, at 487-96 (1966).

POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL,
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tial before the Civil War. a" Again, the difficulties necessitate a thicker
description of the historical context, rather than an abandonment of
interpretive conclusions already expressed. The deep ambivalence within
one strain of American legal thought over the implications of the Fourteenth Amendment must be given greater recognition in Ackerman's
account, for the Middle Republic, and even its Modem successor, were
far less willing to accept the postwar constitutional settlement than Ackerman so far acknowledges.3a
We may suppose that these oversimplifications are primarily the ones
necessary in what is really an introductory volume. But Ackerman's historicism must become more historical if it is ultimately to succeed. We
can hope for a different, more complex, style of historical analysis in the
volumes to come. It would be a shame to be disappointed in this hope.
Surely without intention-for his reading in the secondary historical
literature is both broad and balanced-Ackerman frequently seems here
to be licensing history shorn of its complexities, accidents, paradoxes,
and uncertainties. What his followers (and they will doubtless be many)
might make of such an invitation, we may all have cause to regret.
B.

History as Theory-Burke and Ackerman

To this point, I have stated my belief that Ackerman's conceptual
achievement in the description of American constitutional dualism, along
with his call for a revised constitutional history on dualist premises, are
among the most provocative events in the study of American constitutionalism in the past two decades. I have also indicated-admittedly
imprecisely, given constraints of space and a disinclination to speak too
definitively of the introductory volume in a long and no doubt distinguished series-my "splitter's" view that Ackerman's proposed history
elevates conceptions at the expense of immanent historical complexity.3 6
Perhaps this is only a matter of historiographic taste or the necessities of
composition. But I think it possible that Ackerman's historiography is
34. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992). These matters are further considered in Eben Moglen, The
Transformation of Morton Horwitz, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1042 (1993) (book review).

35. Thus, Felix Frankfurter, writing to Learned Hand scarcely more than a month after the
decision in Brown, decries the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, expresses his willingness to
see it repealed, and ends, plaintively or nauseatingly, according to your view of the matter: "But
since we have it, we have it, and I literally go through torture from time to time." Letter from Felix
Frankfurter to Learned Hand (June 25, 1954) (Hand Papers, folder #20, on file at the Harvard Law
School Library), quoted in HORWITZ, supra note 34, at 259.
36. The distinction between "lumpers" and "splitters," perhaps the most important of
historiographic divisions, has been reinvented many times. As a division between hedgehogs and
foxes, we owe it to Sir Isaiah Berlin. See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox: AN
ESSAY ON ToLSTOY'S VIEW OF HISTORY (1953). In the form I use, it is traceable to J.H. HEXTER,
The HistoricalMethod of Christopher Hill, in ON HISTORIANS: REAPPRAISALS OF SOME OF THE
MAKERS OF MODERN HISTORY (1979). See also Eben Moglen, Two Jewish Justices, 89 COLUM. L.

REV. 959 (1989) (book review).
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more directly related to his theoretical position, and in particular to the
rejection of what he calls "American Burkeanism."
Ackerman recognizes significant bases of agreement between his own
positions and those theorists and practitioners who treat our constitutional heritage as consisting of
the patterns of concrete decision built up by courts over decades,
generations, centuries. Slowly, often in a half-conscious and circuitous fashion, these decisions build upon one another to yield the
constitutional rights that modem Americans take for granted, just
as they slowly generate precedents that the President and Congress
may use to claim new grants of constitutional authority. The task of
the Burkean lawyer or judge is to master these precedents, thereby
gaining a sense of their hidden potentials for growth and decay (p.
17).
For Burkeans, Ackerman rightly says, the guide to understanding the
constitutional order is "an emphasis on the ongoing cultivation of a concrete historical tradition ....

The Constitution simply cannot be under-

stood by speculative theorists who have failed to immerse themselves in
the historical practice of concrete decision" (p. 18). Readers, too, will
recognize that this is the very position of Ackerman himself.
Yet, Ackerman feels compelled to distance himself from Burkean
interpretations of constitutional history. As I observed in the beginning
of this essay, Ackerman alleges three major failings of Burkean
approaches: "conservative incrementalism," distrust of self-conscious
appeals to principle, and a disdain for mass politics (pp. 19-22). If these
were the essence of something to be called American Burkeanism, Ackerman might be right to separate himself from it. But I think these are
epiphenomenal observations-criticisms of Burke rather than Burkeanism, or objections to Burke done badly. My own case, tentatively submitted to be sure, is that Bruce Ackerman is the new American Burkean,
and that recognition of this fact will help him evolve his project in the
most satisfying way.
Let us take, first, the question of conservative incrementalism. "Conservative," as a mere term of derogation in Ackerman's vocabulary, we
may put aside for the nonce. Certainly, when we come to the essence of
the matter, Burkean theories are evolutionary, historicist theories of
political development. Ackerman, too, is committed to an evolutionary
approach to our constitutional tradition. This first objection to Burkeanism, then, hinges on the question of incremental as opposed to discontinuous or saltational change:
Although gradual adaptation is an important part of the story, the
Constitution cannot be understood without recognizing that Americans have, time and time again, successfully repudiated large chunks
of their past and transformed their higher law to express deep
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changes in their political identities ....

American history has been

punctuated by successful exercises in revolutionary reform (p. 19)
(endnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
This is a remarkably interesting and fertile passage, pointing to an important truth about all evolutionary theories, whether political or biological.
Evolution does not imply, in and of itself, uniformitarian principles about
rates of change. Ackerman's approach to constitutional evolution is to
point to short intense periods of discontinuous change, punctuating long
periods of deliberately "preservationist" activity, including preservationist judicial review. Ackerman's very use of the word "punctuated" is
interesting, for it resonates with recent theoretical controversy among the
greatest evolutionists of all-biological scientists committed to the Darwinian view of the history of life. Since 1976, one group of Darwinian
theorists has campaigned for an approach to evolutionary history clustered around the concept of "punctuated equilibrium," in which speciation and other higher-order evolutionary change occurs primarily in
short periods of crisis, pretermitting the usual condition of lengthy stasis.3 7 Darwin believed that natura non facit saltum, but this is not the
essence of Darwinism, and Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge
remain Darwinists. So, too, with Burke, whose belief in incrementalism
can be exaggerated-like every educated Englishman of his generation,
Burke understood only too well the importance of revolutionary change
in the formation of the English constitution. Ackerman has contributed,
to organicist theories of American constitutional law what Eldredge and
Gould contributed to Darwinism-the concept of punctuated equilibrium as a model of historical change. Such a conception is a useful theoretical refinement, but it is not the center of a difference between
"Burkeans" and "dualists."
Ackerman's other objections to "Burkean" theory-that it is "conservative," suspicious of self-conscious appeals to principle, and disdainful of mass politics-seem even less convincing as divisions of kind.
Ackerman himself observes that traditionalist historicism "can be elaborated in conservative or reformist directions" (p. 17). That Ackerman is
reformist we may take on his own statement; that he is accordingly not a
Burkean is on his own account non sequitur. Edmund Burke himself, to
be sure, was a conservative intellectual politician of the eighteenth century, and his expressions of disdain for mass politics, and plain belief that
people should be ruled by their intellectual and moral betters, with what
Ackerman rightly calls "a broad wink" in the direction of republicanism,
are quite obvious.3 " But so are the same conceptions in the minds of
37. See Niles Eldredge & Stephen J. Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic
Gradualism, in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82-115 (T.J.M. Schopf ed., 1976).
38. As Ackerman acknowledges, however, "[tihe historical Burke is a far more complex figure
than the conservative incrementalist of modern fiction" (p. 326 n.29). Indeed, with the pluralist
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John Adams and John Jay-one a member of the founding revolutionary
pantheon, and the other one-third of the brain of "Publius." All three
we may take to be out of step with the political realities of our time, and
our constitutional regime, but constitutional dualists and founders of our
tradition nonetheless.
The "Burkean" suspicion of overarching theory, and awareness of the
danger presented by too complete a dedication to the pursuit of utopian
visions, while undeniable, are not at odds with Ackerman's project.
"Burkeans," Ackerman says, "can easily become part of the problem,
rather than its solution ...

by taking advantage of the citizenry's weak

involvement in normal politics to embrace 'statesmanly' solutions that
undercut fundamental principles previously affirmed by the People" (p.
21). But a dualist "Burkean" could also diminish that tendency, by
emphasizing the importance of preservationist institutions, judicial
review above all, that restrain it.
Putting these qualifications aside, what is "American Burkeanism"?
Perhaps Ackerman's eponymous phrase is the problem. Burke, like
Marx and Freud, has followers in quarters where the master would have
feared to tread. Many, moreover, who believe-as Ackerman's
"Burkean" lawyer does-that the study of the legal past means mastering the "hidden potentials for growth and decay" contained within the
body of existing doctrine, would, like Ackerman, hesitate to identify
themselves with Burke. The line of distinction might be captured,
instead, by referring to "rationalist" and "organicist" interpretations of
American constitutionalism. Organicist readings of our constitutional
tradition emphasize the accretive, unconscious construction of our
processes of self-government. Legal development is organic, among
other senses, in that it is autonomous, responding to its own inner
dynamic of development, rather than the external intellectual compulsion provided by the rationalist's favorite approaches: the schematic
delineation of our eternal natural rights, or the public choice calculus of
legislative supremacy, for example. In Ackerman's thought, this connection between organicism and the intellectual culture of our constitutionalism is explicit:
I believe that American law in general, and constitutional law in
particular, is a relatively autonomous part of our culture. It is relatively autonomous in that what counts as a plausible legal argument
does indeed change, and change profoundly, over time. But it is
relatively autonomous in that, at any moment of time, even the most
elements of Burke's thought, rendered uppermost in Conor Cruise O'Brien's brilliant critical
biography, Ackerman should find himself entirely at home. See CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE
GREAT MELODY: A THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY AND COMMENTED ANTHOLOGY OF EDMUND BURKE

(1992).

A similarly nuanced view of Burke's thought, influential in shaping all but the most

conservative writing on Burke in the past fifteen years, can be found in ISAAC KRAMNICK, THE
RAGE OF EDMUND BURKE: PORTRAIT OF AN AMBIVALENT CONSERVATIVE

(1977).

1993]

Moglen

powerful of our lawyers and judges are profoundly constrained by
the patterns of argument built up by the legal community over the
past two centuries of disputation-more powerfully than the judges
themselves recognize, for they do not consciously interrogate many
of the core elements of their legal culture. They simply take them
for granted as they go about their business deciding cases (p. 39)
(emphasis in original).
The result, as one British Ackermanian has written, is that
[flar from any resemblance to those propositions in geometry and
metaphysics which admit no medium, but must be true or false in all
their latitude, social and civil freedom ... are variously mixed and
modified, enjoyed in very different degrees, and shaped into a diversity of forms, according to the temper and circumstances of every
community.
Dualism is an organicist constitutionalism, but one which stresses-as
Ackerman says-that constitutional law is only relatively autonomous.
Social stresses provoke unusually high levels of political involvement,
bringing about-in ways it is the business of constitutional history to
study and describe-episodic and discontinuous change. The particular
dualism of the Federalist Framers took for granted that heightened political activity intended to reduce the autonomy of constitutional law would
be infrequent and costly. Ackerman himself is at pains to remind us of
the costs:
Th[e] incredible diversity of lived experience is itself one of the great
glories of America; and it could not be achieved if everybody placed
national citizenship first all of the time.... From this point of view,
the greatest moments of constitutional creativity in American history can never be viewed as unmixed blessings. Even the successes
take all of us away from too much that is too close to home. Little
wonder that so many (but not all) of our great constitutional turning
points have been associated with terrible wars or economic disasters.
Surely it is a great and good thing for us to work productively as
citizens, when the times or our consciences require it. But it is no
less important to explore very different worlds of meaning-with
only a few intimates, or a thousand fellow workers; worlds that
invite us to move beyond geographic boundaries to seek religious or
cultural association with different and distant people. These disparate values are placed in jeopardy by too great a fixation on constitutional politics, private citizenship .... We would lose too much of
value if we were constantly debating the future of America with one
another ....
Only if a substantial number of citizens believe that
39. Letter from Edmund Burke to John Farr and John Harris, Esqrs., Sheriffs of the City of
Bristol, on the Affairs of America (1777), in EDMUND BURKE: SELECTED WORKS 211 (Walter J.
Bate ed., 1960).
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there is something really wrong with the higher law tradition is it
appropriate for them to force the rest of us to engage actively in the
arduous enterprise of collective renewal and redefinition (pp. 30607) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).10
Essentially the same point has been put, in a more aphoristic style, as
follows: "The bulk of mankind, on their part, are not excessively curious
concerning any theories whilst they are really happy; and one sure symptom of an ill-conducted state is the propensity of the people to resort to
them."

41

As Ackerman says, "the dualist and the Burkean can discover common ground" (p. 21). Perhaps, at the end of the day, the ground is not
only common, but congruent. Ackerman calls the organicist strand of
modem constitutional thought "Burkean, since it has yet to find its modem spokesman who is Burke's equal" (p. 17). Perhaps I am wrong in my
belief, and Ackerman's future writing will show me wrong, but I believe
that, malgri lui, Ackerman has now begun the noble work of becoming
that spokesman. I for one wish him well, and await with the greatest
interest, along with a grain of suspicion, the fulfillment of the enterprise.

40. As an example of a great constitutional turning point not associated with terrible war or
economic disaster, Ackerman offers the example of the civil rights movement (p. 306 n.*). The
exception may not be historically justifiable. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold
War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
41. Burke, supra note 39, at 211-12.

